My general research interest is in how organizations can use modern technologies to make better decisions. I am especially interested in behavior in digital platforms, contests, and communities as well as crowdsourcing and the wisdom of crowds.
NotebookLM Summary on Soundcloud: https://on.soundcloud.com/EWsChVX3QbN9Asap8
Together with: Ananya Sen (Carnegie Mellon), Pedro Ferreira (Carnegie Mellon), Jörg Claussen (LMU Munich)
Management Science: https://pubsonline.informs.org/doi/abs/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4962
Many platforms host User Generated Content (UGC) and content developed by professionals side by side. However, so far their impact on platform ecosystems has been mostly studied in isolation. In this paper, we use data from a network of 122 local news outlets hosted by an online news platform to study the spillover effects from UGC developed by citizen journalists to the content developed by professional journalists. We use the removal of a status index associated with citizen journalists as an exogenous shock to their supply of UGC to identify these spillover effects. We find that experienced citizen journalists reduce their production of content when this status index is removed. We then find that inexperienced professional journalists increase their output in response to this behavior. However, as a result of these changes, we find a reduction in the overall content hosted by the platform, especially in the case of local news, and in more isolated regions. We further show that this is likely to have detrimental effects for the platform. In particular, there is a decline in overall viewership and the platform may need to hire and pay salaries to more professional journalists to produce enough articles to close the gap left by the departing citizen journalists. Our work contributes to the literature on UGC and online platforms, as well as to the literature on local news.
Together with: Christoph Riedl (Northeastern University) and Christopher Lettl (WU Vienna)
Organization Science https://pubsonline.informs.org/doi/epdf/10.1287/orsc.2021.15163 (Open Access)
Crowdsourcing has evolved as an organizational approach to distributed problem solving and innovation. As contests are embedded in online communities and evaluation rights are assigned to the crowd, community members face a tension: They find themselves exposed to both competitive motives to win the contest prize and collaborative participation motives in the community. The competitive motive suggests they may evaluate rivals strategically according to their self-interest, the collaborative motive suggests they may evaluate their peers truthfully according to mutual interest. Using field data from Threadless on 38 million peer evaluations of more than 150,000 submissions across 75,000 individuals over 10 years and two natural experiments to rule out alternative explanations, we answer the question of how community members resolve this tension. We show that as their skill level increases, they become increasingly competitive and shift from using self-promotion to sabotaging their closest competitors. However, we also find signs of collaborative behavior when high-skilled members show leniency toward those community members who do not directly threaten their chance of winning. We explain how the individual-level use of strategic evaluations translates into important organizational-level outcomes by affecting the community structure through individuals’ long-term participation. Although low-skill targets of sabotage are less likely to participate in future contests, high-skill targets are more likely. This suggests a feedback loop between competitive evaluation behavior and future participation. These findings have important implications for the literature on crowdsourcing design, and the evolution and sustainability of crowdsourcing communities.
NotebookLM Summary on Soundcloud: https://on.soundcloud.com/Z97U2EbSHZfDRQ2YA
Together with: Christoph Riedl (Northeastern University) and Gavin Kilduff (New York University)
Accepted at Management Science
Existing rivalry research finds that people try harder and perform better when competing against their rivals. However, are there conditions under which rivalry can harm performance? We integrate rivalry theory with regulatory fit theory to propose two moderators of rivalry: individual skill and situational risk for status change. We test our predictions using data from software programming contests involving over 4.6 million competitive encounters across 16,846 software developers (“coders”), which provides the power and precision to examine the conditions under which rivalry may backfire. We find that, on average, coders who are randomly assigned to compete against a field of competitors with whom they share a rivalrous history exhibit higher performance, above and beyond other established drivers of performance in competition. Importantly, however, these positive effects of rivalry are moderated by 1) coders’ skill level, such that rivalry is more beneficial for more skilled coders and is harmful for less skilled coders, and 2) coders’ risk of experiencing a status change, such that coders who face a possible status loss exhibit decreased performance when competing against rivals. Thus, we extend research on rivalry by revealing the conditions under which it can harm performance, which is vital to understanding its role in organizations.
Together with: Alexander Staub (WU Vienna) and Christopher Lettl (WU Vienna)
Revising
Firm-hosted online communities can be a source of competitive advantage but often suffer from members' low levels of contributions in terms of quantity and quality. However, establishing governance mechanisms to steer participants’ behavior towards value-generating activities is challenging. We study how the governance intervention of introducing performance-contingent symbolic awards affects contribution behavior and the role of heterogeneity in members’ experience. Exploiting a natural experiment in a firm-hosted online community, we find that the intervention backfires both in terms of contribution quantity and quality, and that within-community experience of members is an important determinant of how they react. However, we also find positive effects such as a reduction in the response time to questions and an increase in the difficulty of questions that are answered.
Together with: Johannes Ross (Copenhagen Business School), Vera Rocha (Copenhagen Business School), Jörg Claussen (LMU Munich & Copenhagen Business School)
The rise of the sharing economy has enabled more efficient use of particular resources and the generation of additional income streams for individuals via collaborative peer-to- peer, platform-mediated transactions. In this paper, we study one of the potential dark sides of this phenomenon: the taxes evaded in those transactions. We integrate detailed data on Airbnb rental activities with individual-level administrative microdata to address two main questions: First, who participates in the sharing economy as a host on Airbnb? Second, how much taxes are potentially evaded on Airbnb transactions, and which hosts are more likely to under-report the income they earn on short-term rentals? We leverage the strict housing regulations in Denmark and detailed data on 27,734 listings and 22,834 unique hosts that were active in Copenhagen and surroundings in 2017-2018 to provide novel evidence on the different types of Airbnb hosts and uncover substantial levels of undeclared income earned on the platform. We find significant associations between individuals’ socio-economic background and their participation on Airbnb as a host. Our analyses furthermore reveal non-negligible effects of these rental activities on undeclared income - back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that nearly 420 million DKK in income may have been undeclared just in the Copenhagen area in those two years combined. Finally, we identify individual characteristics that significantly predict income under- reporting in this context. Our findings can be informative for policymakers and motivate future research on the impact of platform regulation on individual behavior.
Together with: Christian Garaus (BOKU Vienna) and Christopher Lettl (WU Vienna)
Idea evaluation is a fundamental task for organizations. Traditionally, organizations try to allocate tasks by matching task requirements and relevant knowledge. Due to internal challenges associated with evaluating crowdsourced ideas, organizations increasingly turn to crowds for the evaluation of ideas. Contrary to traditional evaluation processes, crowd evaluation relies on the self-selection of evaluators. In this study, we investigate how the matching of tasks and evaluators based knowledge similarity and self-selection of evaluators influence the outcome of crowd evaluations. We analyze 5,206 potential evaluations and 701 realized evaluations of ideas in a real crowd-evaluation context. By considering self-selection, which is a fundamental mechanism for new forms of organizing, our results reveal that while self-selection based on knowledge similarity might improve crowd evaluation outcomes overall, the effects are more nuanced when considering different sub-dimensions of idea quality.
Competition and forecasting performance (data analysis)
Wisdom of crowds under self-selection (finalizing simulation design)
Strategic behavior across modes of communication (data analysis)